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Since the dawn of democracy, societies have been experimenting with technological means to 
tackle corruption and avoid the need to trust officials. Excavations of Ancient Greece have 
revealed mechanisms that were clearly designed to ensure allotment: the randomness of the 
selection of people for office. In response to a rash of corrupted elections in the US in the late 
19th century, countless devices were created that promised to provide incorruptible vote 
recording and counting. Thomas Edison even patented an electronic vote-recording device, and 
monstrous Metropolis-style lever machines persisted in some US states until very recently.   
Throughout the history of democracy, there’s been a battle between those trying to ensure the 
integrity of elections and those seeking to undermine them. The human ingenuity that has been 
poured into this war is truly impressive; see Andrew Gumbel’s Steal this Vote: Dirty Elections and 
the Rotten History of Democracy in America for a highly entertaining—and somewhat terrifying—
account.1 The combat continues unabated, but now with new technology available to both sides. 
Cryptographers and those in information security have attempted to address the problem since 
the turn of the 21st century. Modern cryptography opens up a realm of new possibilities, but like 
all technology, cryptography and digital innovations are double-edged swords, opening up new 
threats.  
Some argue that voting is a human activity that should remain in the traditional, even 
ceremonial realm: casting paper votes into ballot boxes and counting the resulting pile of ballots 
by hand. Others worry that any move to digital voting technology will enable systematic 
corruption. This position does hold some merit: it’s true that any hasty, ill-thought-out innovation 
could result in disaster. Indeed, this has been demonstrated many times, such as with the 
California Top-to-Bottom Review of voting (https:www.sos.ca.gov/voting-systems/oversight/top-
to-bottom-review.htm), where the team analyzing commercial voting systems in California 
declared that “virtually every important software security mechanism is vulnerable to 
circumvention.” It’s clear, then, that innovations must be developed with extreme care. But the 
argument that moving away from the traditional voting system will be disastrous is misguided.  
End-to-End Verifiability 
The promise of end-to-end verifiability (E2EV) gives us hope that digital technologies can provide 
benefits in terms of security, and not just in terms of convenience and usability. E2EV uses some 
of the novel properties of modern cryptography to offer something completely new and quite 
remarkable: the means for a voter to confirm that her vote is accurately included in the tally while 
preventing any third party from determining how she voted, even with her cooperation. In 
essence, the voter can privately create an encryption of her vote. All encrypted votes are posted 
to a public website, where voters can confirm that their vote is correctly recorded. The batch of 
encrypted votes is then anonymized and decrypted in a universally verifiable fashion, and can 
then be tabulated. 
The fundamental challenge in public voting is how to reconcile the conflict between 
demonstrable integrity and ballot privacy. The E2EV solution is the classic computer science way 
of introducing an indirection: the encryption and decryption of votes. A short, gentle introduction 
to E2EV can be found at http://arxiv.org/abs/1504.03778. Although E2EV sounds simple, it’s really 
quite complex. The implementation of E2EV has to be sufficiently simple and usable for voters, 
election officials, and candidates to feel comfortable with. A particularly delicate step is 
encrypting the ballot in such a way so that the voter is confident that her vote has been correctly 
encoded without involving a third party. The most common approach to achieving ballot 
assurance is known as the Benaloh challenge: a voter tells the device how he wishes to vote and 
this commits to an encryption. The voter can now challenge this—requiring that the encryption 
be opened—or cast his ballot. The voter is free to repeat this as many times as he wishes until he 
feels confident that the device is behaving correctly. Of course, it’s essential that the device not 
know in advance how the voter will choose. 
In recent years, we’ve seen such systems start to move from academic articles into the real 
world. In 2009 the Scantegrity II system, which uses the E2E approach, was successfully used in 
municipal elections in Takoma Park, Maryland.2 
vVote 
Last November in Victoria, Australia, a system called vVote, based on the Prêt à Voter approach,3 
was successfully used by a section of the electorate. The system allowed for E2EV electronic voting 
in supervised polling places—the first time this has been done in a politically binding state-wide 
election—for voters with disabilities such as vision impairment, and for Australian citizens voting 
remotely from London, England. Votes were cast privately in a voting booth and then transferred 
electronically to a central count. Because the electronic system ran in parallel with the traditional 
paper voting system, the final step in which the electronic votes were merged with the physical 
ones could only be observed by poll watchers who were present. Apart from that, all other steps 
could be verified by voters.  
The key idea behind the Prêt à Voter approach, which vVote inherits, is to encode votes using 
a randomized candidate list, which ensures the secrecy of each vote and removes any bias. Once 
the ballot is marked by the voter, the candidate list is detached and destroyed. An encryption of 
the candidate order is preserved and used to extract the vote during tabulation.  
This gives voters four steps of verification: 
1. Before casting a vote, voters can confirm that the printed ballot with the randomized 
candidate list is properly constructed. When given a ballot, voters can choose to challenge it 
by demanding cryptographic proof of its correctness, which they can take home and verify. 
Voters can challenge as many ballots as they like before accepting one. 
2. When the voting computer prints out their marked ballot, voters can check that the marks 
align properly with the randomized candidate list. 
3. Once the candidate list is destroyed, voters leave the polling place with a receipt that 
includes their printed ballot and the encrypted candidate order. Voters can see that their 
ballot appears on a public list of accepted votes without revealing how they voted. 
4. Anyone can verify that all the votes on the public list are properly shuffled and decrypted. 
All of these steps—aside from the second—can be performed by or with the help of proxies of 
the voter’s choice. Every aspect of the system is available for scrutiny: every check that the voter 
performs with a computer can be independently recompiled, reimplemented, or performed by a 
completely independent party of the voter’s choice.  
The source code for vVote is available at https://bitbucket.org/vvote. A nontechnical guide is 
available at http://electionwatch.edu.au/victoria-2014/click-here-democracy-e-vote-explained, 
and the complete system description and security analysis can be found in Chris Culnane and his 
colleagues’ “vVote: A Verifiable Voting System.”4 
The vVote system was designed to handle up to hundreds of thousands of votes, though for 
this particular election, access to the system within the State of Victoria was restricted to 24 early 
voting centers and to voters with disabilities. In addition, voters in London, England, were able to 
use the system to cast their vote in a supervised polling place at the Australian High Commission. 
For these groups, 1,121 votes were cast on the system, more than the number of remote 
electronic votes cast in 2010, and with a quarter of the number of polling places available.  A 
survey of the voters in London found that over 75% agreed or strongly agreed with the statement 
that the system was easy to use. 
Issues and Challenges  
Although voter feedback seems to be fairly positive, there are some issues regarding existing E2EV 
techniques. The very concept of being able to verify a vote rather than blindly trusting a system 
is novel for voters and requires an effort by the authorities to educate and motivate the 
electorate. Usability remains a challenge for E2EV systems, as discussed in Fatih Karayumak and 
his colleague’s “User Study of the Improved Helios Voting System Interfaces.”5 Verification needs 
to be simple enough so voters can understand its purpose and feel motivated to perform the 
checks in significant numbers. It’s not sufficient for voters to simply follow the system’s 
instructions—without performing any checks—as attackers could manipulate the code issuing the 
instructions. 
Another challenge is that a system can’t simply be verifiable—it’s essential that the system is 
actually verified—randomly—many times to ensure confidence in the result. In the case of the 
November 2014 election in Victoria, observation of the remote voters in London suggests that the 
majority did perform some check of the printed receipt against the candidate list, and around 13 
percent of those using vVote checked receipts on the public website. 6 
There are a number of alternative commercial systems that claim to be verifiable but don’t 
actually allow voters to perform their own checks. Of course, this can result in a more appealing 
“vote and go” user interface. With the iVote system, used in the 2015 state elections in Victoria’s 
neighboring state of New South Wales, only a small number of chosen auditors can verify the 
system’s output. Voters can check their own votes only by querying a database, instead of seeing 
the evidence themselves and checking it with their own machine as they can with E2EV voting.  
One of the authors of this article co-discovered a serious security vulnerability in the 2015 New 
South Wales election. It was easily patched, but only after 66,000 votes had been cast.7 Given that 
iVote’s “verification” mechanism is unavailable for external review, there’s a risk that it contains 
errors or security holes. This is important because each concentration of trust in a small number 
of computers represents a potential avenue for undetectable, large-scale electoral manipulation 
if the attacker can compromise that small set. 
System Verification versus E2EV 
It’s important to note that the philosophy behind E2EV systems is quite different than what’s 
usually meant by “system verification.” In the latter, the idea is to perform a detailed analysis of 
a system’s design and implementation against a set of required properties. Thus, as long as the 
verified code is running at execution time, and the verification is complete and correct, the system 
should uphold the required properties. In practice, it’s extremely difficult to achieve all this, 
especially due to the rather open, distributed nature of voting systems.  
By contrast, E2EV seeks to ensure that the system execution is fully auditable. This idea is nicely 
captured in Josh Benaloh’s maxim: “Verify the election, not the system.” A related concept is 
Ronald L. Rivest and John P. Wack’s notion of “software independence,” which says that any error 
in the code that could result in a change in the outcome must be detectable at execution time 
(http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/RivestWack-
OnTheNotionOfSoftwareIndependenceInVotingSystems.pdf). Of course, this doesn’t mean that 
verification of the design and code should be neglected—it just means that the integrity of the 
outcome should not be dependent on assumptions about the correctness of the running code. 
Another project is the End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting Project 
(www.overseasvotefoundation.org/E2E-Verifiable-Internet-Voting-Project/News), which is 
examining E2EV in an attempt to define the real requirements of verifiability, so vendor systems 
that are not truly E2EV—but claim to be—can be differentiated from systems that are. 
End-to-end verifiability represents a paradigm shift in electronic voting, providing a way to verify 
the integrity of the election by allowing voters to audit the information published by the system, 
rather than trusting that the system has behaved correctly. Recent deployments of E2EV systems 
in real elections demonstrate its practical applicability, and we hope to one day see E2EV as the 
normal expectation for electronic voting systems. 
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Abstract: End-to-end verifiability represents a paradigm shift in electronic voting, providing a 
way to verify the integrity of the election by allowing voters to audit the information published 
by the system, rather than trusting that the system has behaved correctly. Recent deployments 
of these systems in real elections demonstrate its practical applicability. 
